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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Appellee Davidson Trust Company (hereinafter "Davidson

Trust")

has no

additions/corrections to the description of the Nature of the Case provided by Appellant
Lawrence Spencer (hereinafter "Spencer").
B.

Course of the Proceedings

Davidson Trust provides the following additions/corrections to the Course of the
Proceedings submitted by Spencer:
The March 6, 2007 Decision by the district court granted summary judgment as to all
Defendants. (Clerk's Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R"), p. 80)
C.

Statements of the Pacts

Davidson Trust provides the following additionslcorrections to the Statement of the Facts
submitted by Spencer:
Paragraph 5:' The 1981 Skyline Mobile Home secured by Deed of Trust #1 (hereinafter
"DOT #I") had a VIN of 0191030213, which is slightly different than that stated in Spencer's
Statement of the Facts. (Clerk's Augmented Record on Appeal (hereinafter "AR"), p. 9)
Regarding the status of the mobile home secured by DOT #I, the relevant documents state as
follows in describing the mobile home as real property:

'

The mobile home is also referred to as personal property in paragraphs 8 , 9 , 13, 17,21,22, and 23

DOT #I is secured by "that property in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, described as
follows, either located within an incorporated city or village at the date hereof, or containing not
I

more than forty acres:" and goes on to describe Parcels 1, 2, and 3, "TOGETI-FER WITH 1981
Skyline Mobile Home, 24x56, Vin #01910302P." (AR, pp. 3-4)
The Amended Trustee's Deed relating to DOT #I states that the Trustee "does hereby
Bargain, Sell and Convey, without warranty . . . all the real property situated in the County of
Kootenai, State of Idaho described as follows:", which is followed by a description of Parcels 1, 2,
I

and 3, along with the following: "Together with 1981 Skyline Mobile Home, 24x56, Vin
#01910302P and all appurtenances attached thereto." (AR, pp. 12-14, emphasis added) As with the

I

Amended Deed of Trust, the original Trustee's Deed's description of real property includes the
1981 Skyline Mobile Home. (AR, pp. 9-1 1)
The Loan Commitment Agreement relating to Deed of Trust #2 (hereinafter "DOT #2")
states in paragraph A: "Borrower hereby agrees to the proposed loan, to be secured by that certain
parcel of real estate legally described as follows:", which is followed by a legal description for
Parcel 3 and the following language: "Along with easements for ingress, egress, and utilities,
adequate for county building permit TOGETHER WITH a 1977 Mobile Home, VIN #73165."
(AR, pp. 36-38)
Paragraph 7: The Promissory Note secured by DOT #2 is for $65,000. (AR, p. 33) The
Loan Commitment Agreement states that funds were to be held back by Davidson Trust pending
the completion of certain items by Spencer. Because Spencer did not complete the mobile home
remodel and incur the costs described under subsection (g) of paragraph D, the $5,000 was not

distributed. (AR, p. 45, Response to Request for Admission No. 8) However, the work was
performed by Jameson and paid for in an amount greater than $5,000. (AR, p. 146) Regardless,
the Promissory Note obligated Spencer for a total amount of $65,000, as admitted by Spencer.
(AR, p. 45, Response to Request for Admission No. 9)
Paragraph 17:

At the foreclosure sale relating to DOT #I, Davidson Trust bid

$204,074.37. (AR, p. 79,76)
Paragraph 26: The true indebtedness at the time of the auction was $204,074.37. As
Spencer acknowledged in the note secured by DOT #2, the amount owed was $65,000. (AR, p.
45, Response to Request for Admission No. 9)
Paragraph 27: The total credit bids from Davidson Trust totaled $204,074.37, as the
credit bid on DOT #I included the $86,507.45 owed on DOT #2, which was a recorded lien still
of record at the time the foreclosure on DOT #1 took place. (AR, pp. 8,29-30 and 79)
Paragraph 28: There was no surplus as the credit bid of $204,074.37 reflected the total
amount owed on DOT #1 and DOT #2.

II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Davidson Trust adopts the two issues set forth in Spencer's brief, and includes the
following additional issue:
C.

Is Davidson Trust Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees Pursuant to Idaho
Code 9 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41'

111.

ARGUMENT

I
I

A.

Legal Standards

I

Davidson Trust agrees with the standards relating to summary judgment motions, and the
quoted Idaho Code statutes and the case law citations are accurate and appropriate for discussion.
However, their application by Spencer is misguided and the conclusion or conclusions reached
I

I
I

I

by Spencer do not follow.
B.

Argument

1.

The District Court Appropriately Granted Summary Judgment
a.

I

The Credit Bids were Proper

Despite Spencer's arguments to the contrary, the record reflects that Davidson Trust
believed the amount owed by Spencer on the loans was $204,074.37. Why this is the correct

I
I

I

1

amount will be addressed below.

In its decision granting summary judgment, the trial court agreed with Davidson Trust
and Jameson that Davidson Trust submitted an appropriate credit bid in the amount of
$86,507.45, "reflecting the amount owed to it on DOT #2." The trial court concluded that the
credit bid complied with the statutory requirements of Idaho Code 5 45-1506(9). (R, p. 76) The
trial court also found that although Spencer had not completed the mobile home remodel called

I

for in paragraph D(g) of the Loan Commitment Agreement for DOT #2, because Jameson had
expended $5,000 for those costs, and pursuant to the terms of DOT #2, Davidson Trust was
entitled to include the $5,000 as an amount owed by Spencer on DOT #2. (R, pp. 77, 86-87)

As to the DOT #I foreclosure sale, a finding that the credit bid and foreclosure sale were
appropriate is a logical extension of this Court's ruling in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v.
Apyel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 (2006), and Idaho Code $45-1507.

There is no reason why the holder of the deed of trust note should not be able to
purchase the property at a trustee sale by bidding in all or part of the amount
owing pursuant to the note. After all, the holder of the note is the party to be
benefited by the sale. It makes no sense to require the note holder to bring cash to
the sale in order to pay himself. His bid, if successful, immediately reduces or
eliminates the debtor's obligation. We hold that where the holder of the deed of
trust note is the bidder, crediting the bid against the note is the equivalent of a
cash sale.

Federal Home Loan, 137 P.3d at 432.
Idaho Code $ 45-1507 indicates that the proceeds of the trustee's sale will be applied as
follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

To the expenses of the sale . . . .
To the obligation secured by the trust deed.
To any persons having recorded liens subsequent to the interest of the trustee in
the trust deed as their interest may appear.
The surplus, if any, to the grantor of the trust deed or to his successor in interest
entitled to such surplus.

At the time of the DOT #1 foreclosure sale, under the statute DOT #2 was a recorded lien
"subsequent to the interest of the trustee in the trust deed as their interest may appear." While

- the foreclosure sale on DOT #2 had taken place at approximately 10:OO a.m., that sale had not
eliminated the recorded lien which occurred subsequent to the interest conveyed by DOT #I.
The foreclosure sale on DOT #I took place at approximately 10:30 a.m. The Trustee's Deed,
which eliminated the DOT #2 lien, was filed at 1 1 :29 a.m. on the same day as the sales. (AR, pp.

In Federal Horne Loan, the Court reached the logical conclusion that a credit bidder need
not bring in cash to pay itself. Similarly, this Court should conclude that where the party making
a credit bid who is secured by the trust deed as well as a subsequently recorded lien, can and
should bid the total amount owed on both those obligations. Federal Home Loan and the
language of Idaho Code 5 45-1 507 support such a conclusion. To do otherwise would encourage
competing bids in amounts less than the total of those two debts, leaving the creditor at risk of
losing the property without having the debts paid. To find otherwise would lead to the absurd
result argued by Spencer in this case.
Spencer argues that at the time of the foreclosure sale on DOT #1, he was prepared to bid
$1 17,566.92, but no more. Clearly, his intention was to try to take advantage of the theory he
now argues to the court. That theory would cause a severe injustice as it would result in his
escaping over $86,000 in legitimate debt owed to Davidson Trust as custodian of the IRAISEP
account. Davidson Trust appropriately protected its interests by making its bid, which at the
time included the DOT #2 amount which was protected by a still-recorded lien.
Spencer's reliance on Alpine Villa Development Co., Inc. v Young, 99 Idaho 851, 590
P.2d 578 (1979), is misplaced. Alpine Villa is focused on the ability of a junior lien holder to
obtain a deficiency judgment under Idaho Code

5

45-1512. In that case, Alpine Villa was a

-

junior lien holder that foreclosed on four condominium properties, bidding the full amounts
owed on the liens and taking them subject to priority bank liens. When the priority lien holder
subsequently foreclosed, successfully bidding only the amount due on the priority liens, Alpine
Villa filed an action for deficiency judgments on each property, alleging that it had received

nothing for the junior liens. Alpine Villa, 99 Idaho at 851-852. However, the Court focused on

i

statutory language that "superimposes an additional limitation so that a deficiency judgment can
never exceed 'th'e difference between the amount for which such property was sold and the entire
amount of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust."'

Id at 852. The Court ruled that

because Alpine Villa had made credit bids for the amounts owed on its liens, the foreclosure
i

sales prices were identical to the amounts of indebtedness secured by the Alpine Villa deeds of
!

I

trust. Therefore, the statutory language precluded a deficiency judgment. Id. at 852-853.
Spencer apparently attempts to extend the Alpine Villa holding dealing with a deficiency

i

judgment analysis to the facts of this case. However, such an extension is inappropriate where
I

no actual payment was made by Alpine to the primary lien holder, as compared to our situation
I

where payment by way of a credit bid was made on our DOT #2. As indicated above, this
conclusion is supported by Federal Home Loan, which held that a credit bid "constituted

I
payment of the price hid in cash." Federal Home Loan, 137 P.3d at 43 I , citing Rocky Mountain
I

Bank v. Stuavt, 280 Mont. 74, 928 P.2d 432 (1996). As stated by the trial court, the credit bid
made by Davidson Trust at the foreclosure sale on DOT #1 for $204,074.37 was applied first to
the "obligation secured by the trust deed," totaling $1 17,566.92. Idaho Code

5 45-1507(2).

The

remainder of $86,507.45 applied to- the debt owed on DOT #2 to Davidson Trust, a person
having a recorded lien "subsequent to the interest of the trustee in the trust deed" as the interest
may appear. Idaho Code

3 45-1507(3).

No surplus existed to be distributed to Spencer as "the

grantor of the trust deed. . . entitled to such surplus." Idaho Code 3 45-1507(4).

b.
I

The Mobile Home is Not Personal Property

While Spencer argues that the mobile home was personal property, the facts and the

I

underlying case law support the trial court's conclusion that the mobile home was a real property
security interest based upon language in DOT #I, DOT #2, and the Loan Commitment
I

Agreement relating to DOT #2 (R, p. 87; AR, pp. 3-4, 9-1 1,36-38)
A case decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho supports

Davidson Trust's assertion that the mobile home was real property. In re Sasinouski, 52 B.R. 67
(Bankr. Idaho 19859, stands for the proposition that making improvements to the real property and
mobile home indicating an intention to make the mobile home permanent, and listing a mobile
home in the Deed of Trust, created ample evidence showing the mobile home to be real property
through an analysis of Idaho Code

5 67-3078, the predecessor to Idaho Code 5 63-304.

(AR, pp.

Here, the Loan Commitment Agreement called for, and Spencer completed, the following
improvements to the real property and mobile home:
a. Well set-up, with pump, pressure tanks, lines
b. Septic system with inspection & hookup to home
c. Driveway Completion to county standards
d. Power lines &pedestal, with inspection & hookup
e. Mobile Title in file
f. Foundation, decks, & mobile set-up, including
attachment and conversion to real property

$10,000.00
3,000.00
3,000.00
4,500.00
7,000.00

$
$
$
$

$10,000.00

(AR, pp. 34, 36 (emphasis added)) These improvelnents are very similar in nature to the
improvements described in Sasinouski, which included digging a well, pouring footings on which
the mobile home was placed, building an attached three car garage on a foundation, using siding

that matched the mobile home, pouring a driveway, steps, patio and sidewalk, and building covered
patios on the front and the back of the mobile home, and installing necessary utilities, including
electrical service. (AR, p. 163) As indicated above, the mobile home was also listed in the Deeds
of Trust. The similarity of the facts in this case and in Sasinouski leads to the logical conclusion
that the mobile home was real property secured by the Deeds of Trust.
c.

The $5,000.00 is Not Missing

One issue examined closely by the trial court was the $5,000 that is not missing, but was
riot forwarded by Davidson Trust to Spencer in relation to the Promissory Note relating to DOT
#2. This issue was raised during the course of litigating the original summary judgment motion,
and clarified by the trial court during the consideration of Spencer's Motion for Reconsideration.
(R, pp. 75-76, 85-87)
After originally deciding that Davidson Trust's credit bid at the foreclosure sale on DOT
#2 complied with Idaho Code

5 45-1506(9), the court considered additional evidence submitted

for and against Spencer's Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court found that the expenditure
by the IRAISEP account in excess of $5,000 in relation to the items described in paragraph D(g)
of the Loan Commitment Agreement provided sufficient evidence to justify a decision that the
money was owed by Spencer. (R, pp. 85-87)
Spencer complains that the trial court inappropriately took into account money expended
by Davidson Trust, an amount in excess of $5,000, to perfom the improvements called for in
paragraph D(g) of the Loan Commitment Agreement. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22) However,
Spencer neglects to discuss the language of DOT #2, cited by the trial court, as follows:

"Should Grantor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided,
the Beneficiary or Trustee, hut without obligation so to do and without notice to
or demand upon Grantor and without releasing Grantor from any obligation
hereof, may make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either
may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. . . ." PI. Ex. 2, DOT No.,
[sic] 2 at 1, 7 (A)(5) and, "[ulpon default by Grantor in payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby or in performance of any agreement hereunder, all
sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of
Beneficiary." DOT No. 2 at 2,7(B)(6).

(R, p. 86-87) Spencer was indebted on the Promissory Note for $65,000 because of the language
of the note, and because he was in default on the indebtedness. Arguably, he was indebted on
the $65,000 because he had failed to fulfill the requirements of paragraph D(g) of the Loan
Commitment Agreement. The trial court found both a legal basis for its decision based upon
Spencer's default on the note which had a $65,000 face amount, as well as an equitable
justification in that the improvements were made and paid for by Davidson Trust and Jameson as
required in DOT #2. That decision should be affirmed.

d.

Davidson Trust is a Bona Fide Purchaser

As set forth above and below, Davidson Trust had every reason to believe that the
foreclosure sales were conducted in an appropriate fashion. Therefore, the sales are final and
summary judgment was appropriate.

e.

Surplus

Spencer complains that where the district court found that there was an irregularity
without injury, there must have been a surplus. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-26) However, the trial
court's ruling that an irregularity as perceived by the court, without injury, does not result in a
surplus should be affirmed.

With regard to the credit bid on DOT #I, the trial court explained that there was no
surplus based on the foreclosure sale on DOT #1 as follows:
DOT No. 2 was sold to the Trust at 10:OO am. The sale was recorded at 11:30
am. DOT No. 1 was sold to the Trust for $204,074.37 at 10:30 am. This sale
was recorded at 1 1:29 am. At the time of the sale of DOT No. 1, DOT No. 2 was
still a subsequently recorded lien, for purposes of I.C. § 45-1507 (3), as the sale
to the Trust had not yet been recorded. Therefore, the proper application of the
$204,074.37 sale proceeds from DOT No. 1 is as follows: First to the obligation
secured by DOT No. 1, recorded on April 30, 2002, in the amount of
$1 17,566.92, then, to satisfy DOT No. 2, a second mortgage on the property,
recorded November 15,2002 in the amount of $86,507.45.
The $86,507.45 owing on DOT No. 2 at the time of the sale of DOT No. 1 was
properly deducted from the sale proceeds of $204,074.37 pursuant to LC. § 451507(3), leaving no surplus for distribution to Plaintiff.

(R, p. 78) The irregularity referred to by the trial court is the timing of the foreclosure sales,
yvith the sale for DOT #2 coming before the sale for DOT #I. However, as indicated by the trial
court, Idaho Code

9 45-1 507, as applied to the facts of this case, results in no surplus.

Further,

Spencer has suffered no damage as a result of this alleged irregularity. After having defaulted on
both notes, Spencer now tries to benefit from the foreclosure sales going in the order they did.
Because the Trustee's Deed on the sale for DOT #2 had not been recorded at the time that the
sale for DOT #l took place, there is a statutory justification for finding that there was no surplus
based upon the credit bids of Davidson Trust, and Spencer's quest for a windfall fails.
Spencer's example is misleading and contrary to accepted law. First, in Spencer's
example the $10,000 note holder cannot make a $500,000 credit bid. By definition, the note
holder could only credit bid $10,000. Any bid over and above that would he considered a cash
bid over and above his $10,000 note in the amount of $490,000. There would a surplus of

$490,000. That is different from the case here where Davidson Trust had liens on the property
securing a total debt of $204,074.37. Davidson Trust's hid is a credit bid only because that
amount of debt is still secured, and would be "paid" pursuant to Idaho Code 8 45-1507(2) and
(3).
The better manner of conducting the foreclosure sales would have been for the
foreclosure of DOT # l with a bid of $204,074.37 that would have gone first to pay DOT #I, and
then DOT #2. However, as pointed out by the trial court, the timing of the filing of the Trustee's
Deeds provides a statutory justification to avoid the windfall Spencer seeks.

f.

Attorney Pees

What Spencer seeks here is a windfall based upon a frivolous argument that the order of
the sales should result in a windfall of $91,510.45 when it was he who had defaulted on two
loans. (Appellant's Brief, p. 9) His pursuit of this frivolous claim justifies an order of the Court
granting attorney fees and costs to Davidson Trust. For the same reason, Spencer's request for
attorney fees and costs should be denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION
The trial court appropriately granted summary judgment and its decision should be
affirmed. It is also requested that Spencer be required to pay for reasonable attorney fees and
costs for Davidson Trust in defense of this appeal.
DATED this 4thday of March, 2008.
ELSAESSER JARZABEK ANDERSON
MARKS ELLIOTT & McHUGH, CHTD.

~ttorney~for
Davidson Trust Company
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